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Trade unions, when confronted by management with threats of redundancies, often concede 
flexibility in exchange for immediate job security. It is desirable, alongside such instances, to 
develop within the unions a stronger commitment to shaping flexibility into more sustainable 
forms of security for the workforce. How this is to be implemented depends very much on 
the extent to which unions engage, for bargaining purposes, in cross-border networking 
and coordination. Extending the negotiation of European Framework Agreements (EFAs) 
on security – more specifically training, requalification, career progression and competence 
development for the workforce – is crucial since this form of bargaining enhances unions’ 
capacity to negotiate employment security in situations of economic difficulty. Moreover, 
establishing EFAs as agreements negotiated by the European Trade Union Federations 
(ETUFs) at the transnational level in Europe is a means of spreading across countries the 
positive gains achieved in local negotiations where unions are strong to other local subsidiaries where unions may find it more 
of a struggle to negotiate on employment protection issues. 
 Policy recommendations 
Introduction 
The internationalisation of multinationals leads to new 
challenges in the sphere of local, national and transnational 
employment regulation. This Policy Brief presents lessons from 
comparative research on collective bargaining on flexibility 
(i.e. working time, task adaptability, job mobility, wage, type 
of contract) and security (i.e. training, life-long learning and 
career programmes, job guarantees) conducted in multinational 
subsidiaries in Europe. It summarises the research evidence 
of the conditions under which trade unions’ negotiation on 
flexibility and security at the level of the subsidiary may produce 
different outcomes, the aim being to draw policy implications 
for unions. The level and types of labour market flexibility and 
security that are prevalent in any given national case are to 
an important extent influenced by external market factors as 
well as company-level features. The interactions between these 
factors within distinct institutional settings concur to shape local 
union bargaining power over flexibility and security. Flexibility 
and security at the level of the firm are thus an outcome of 
negotiation, not merely a Human Resource Management 
strategy as has been argued by Rydell and Wigblad (2011). 
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The outcomes of local bargaining with regard to flexibility 
and security within multinational subsidiaries in Europe are 
introduced in the first section. These outcomes are influenced 
by the interplay of market competition, the nature of the 
product and the type of international integration characterising 
the multinational in question. The second section discusses 
how unions strategically engage in negotiating flexibility and 
security within subsidiaries, while also examining the important 
role played by EFAs in the negotiation process. Cases show that 
support from the ETUFs in the development of transnational 
coordination and networking not only helps in establishing 
contacts amongst employee representatives and local unions 
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but also provides the basis for collective bargaining on a 
transnational level while at the same time reinforcing local 
trade union power. 
Empirical evidence is based on fieldwork conducted in 
2011-2012, in two EU- and two US-based manufacturing 
multinational subsidiaries in Germany, Belgium, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. The multinationals varied in terms of form of 
international integration (vertical or horizontal), nature of the 
product market (standardised or differentiated), and degree of 
market competitiveness (see Table 1).
Local bargaining over flexibility and 
security compared: distinctiveness of 
multinationals and diversity of “trade-
offs” 
Firm, market and union strategies: the “trade-offs” 
Bargaining over flexibility and security at the subsidiaries of 
multinationals is influenced by the interplay between the 
degree of market competitiveness and firm-level characteristics 
(Pulignano and Keune 2014). These features influence the 
degree of local autonomy that conditions the unions’ local 
capacity to make strategic use in bargaining of their institutional 
and political resources. More local autonomy allows local 
unions and works councils to participate in the definition of 
the extent and the type of flexibilisation, which means to trade 
flexibility for improved security, or to reject further flexibilisation 
and instead strengthen security. The unions have a wider scope 
for negotiation in multinationals that are subject to weak 
competitive forces and that produce differentiated products. 
Local autonomy is limited in companies that face strong 
competition and engage in the production of standardised 
(similar) products. Specifically, tight market competition and 
standardised products set limits on local actors’ negotiating 
discretion insofar as they serve to enhance the control of the 
headquarters over the subsidiary. Conversely, under low market 
competition and differentiated products unions have relatively 
more leeway, in the bargaining process, to achieve local 
accommodation with management. 
Moreover, multinationals can either follow a vertical route to the 
cross-national integration of their operations – when each site 
performs a distinct part of the production process in a vertically 
integrated chain – or they can be horizontally integrated – 
when similar subsidiaries perform essentially the same roles 
in different countries to serve customers on the local market. 
Vertical integration can potentially moderate the adverse 
impact of product standardisation and a high level of market 
competition on the unions’ capacity to bargain by reinforcing 
interdependencies across the different production units along 
the value chain. Under horizontal integration, each subsidiary 
is a perfect substitute in the value chain and this reduces local 
discretion and forces the unions to accept high flexibility as a 
feature inherent in the production relationships with customers. 
Thus, when the multinational is vertically integrated, subject 
to high competition and producing standardised goods, 
the unions are likely to negotiate ‘short-term’ employment 
guarantees for the workforce in exchange for greater flexibility. 
Conversely, by keeping vertical integration constant, with 
differentiated products and a less competitive market situation, 
unions are potentially better positioned to bargain for long-
term employment guarantees. They can moderate the degree of 
flexibility they are prepared to concede, while obtaining long-
term employment protection guarantees. 
While the structural constraints represent a significant conditioning 
factor of bargaining outcomes, the strategic capacity of unions can 
be enhanced also through institutional means (Benassi 2013). 
Specifically, the use of EFAs by unions, within Manu3 and Manu4, 
as an institutional resource in local bargaining has contributed to 
Table 1 Case characteristics
Manu1 Manu2 Manu3 Manu4
MNC American French
Workforce worldwide Nearly 130,000 24,000 100,000 Nearly 70,000 
Sites worldwide 114 >200 >250
Production worldwide 
coverage
70 % Europe, Africa and 
Middle East; 30% North and 
South America, Asia
80 manufacturing - 10 
distribution facilities; 14 engi-
neering and technical centres 
Europe, North America and 
Asia Pacific.
100 countries including 
Europe
56 countries Europe and 
North America 
Average unionisation in the 
investigated plants
80% 85% 68% 47%
Integration Vertical Horizontal Vertical Horizontal
Product Construction machines Emission andride control 
systems 
Transport, power generation 
and transmission
Defence, security, ground 
transport, space and aerospace
Product market Homogeneous Homogeneous Diversified Diversified
Flexibility/security outcomes Balanced trade-off with 
concession
Unbalanced trade-off towards 
the employees
Balanced trade-off without 
concession
Unbalanced trade-off towards 
the employers
3of the need for constant adaptation to customer production 
requirements. While security for employees may also be significant, 
it will be partial nonetheless, being strongly dependent on the 
extent to which the supplier guarantees delivery performance to 
customers. As such, the union has a relatively restricted capacity 
to oppose the headquarters’ demand by negotiating locally 
with management. The result is an unbalanced trade-off to the 
detriment of workers because in the bargaining process employers 
tend to gain in flexibility relatively more than what employees 
are able to retain in terms of security. In the German subsidiary 
(85% union density), the works councils were forced to negotiate 
and accept a high level of flexibility. Although some concessions 
are not to be ruled out – unpaid overtime of one hour a week 
was locally negotiated as a means of saving jobs – flexibility is 
imposed by the use of just-in-time production. The contractual 
relationship between supplier and customer presupposes the 
flexibility of the former. In Belgium (85% union density) and 
Italy (almost 88% union density), local unions were pushed to 
accept higher levels of temporary work and fixed-term contracts 
as a means of responding to customers’ production fluctuations 
without incurring higher costs. Similarly in Britain (93% union 
density), temporary work increased and was combined with a 
10% pay cut.
Manu3: “Balanced trade-offs without 
concessions”
Unions and works councils had relatively greater autonomy to 
reach accommodation with management on local production 
methods and to participate in shaping flexibility in a manner 
that would foster long-term employment security. The result was 
a relatively high level of protection for workers independently 
of the company demand for flexibility (balanced trade-offs 
without concessions). This is not only because of the structural 
characteristics of the subsidiary (i.e. production of a distinctive 
product within a market characterised by entry barriers). The 
negotiation of an EFA in 2010 made national best practices on 
mobility and training-related issues for employment guarantees 
available right across the European workforce. The EFA thereby 
provided an institutional resource of which local unions could 
make strategic use in times of crisis to bargain for high levels 
of security within individual affiliates. The ETUF played a crucial 
role in developing the transnational union coordination of 
bargaining and in ensuring communication among employee 
representatives and trade unions. In this way, they created the 
conditions for the signature of the EFA by the ETUF at the level 
of the sector. Distinctive domestic practices incorporated into 
company-level agreements illustrate the positive effects of the 
EFA on local negotiation. In Germany (75% union density) 
works councils negotiated locally on internal mobility to keep 
workforce capacity in line with expected demand, and to rely 
on the transfer and rotation of expertise across different plants 
when production peaks occurred. Similarly, unions in the UK 
(45-50% union density) were able to negotiate locally on job 
rotation to safeguard jobs, while in Italy (45-50% union density) 
and Belgium (almost 95%) unions bargained for competence 
developments to ensure capacity of the workforce to guarantee 
mobility training.
reinforcing the unions’ participation in the shaping of flexibility 
into long-term employment security. Conversely, the absence of 
EFAs in Manu1 and Manu2 contributed to the unions settling 
for the second best option, namely, the exchange of flexibility for 
short-term job guarantees. 
Below we summarise, for each company case study, the ways 
in which different market- and firm-level contexts influenced 
union bargaining power over flexibility and security. We also 
illustrate the strategies implemented by unions in order to act 
upon those structural conditions and the effects produced by 
those strategies in terms of flexibility and security. We highlight, 
accordingly, the role of EFAs in maintaining local union strength 
and thereby helping them to negotiate local-level long-term 
employment security with management. This effect is particularly 
apparent in those situations where, because of the comparatively 
lower local union density rate, we would have expected lower 
union bargaining power over the content and outcome of the 
negotiation (Brown 2008). At the same time, we observe that, in 
cases where EFAs were not negotiated, even the most powerful 
local unions, with high local density rates, were forced to succumb 
to the pressure for flexibilisation exerted by management. 
Manu1: “Balanced trade-off with concessions” 
Manu1 is a vertically integrated multinational producing 
standardised products in a highly competitive market. The local 
unions’ response to the threat of relocation was concession 
bargaining, exchanging flexibility (to the benefit of employers) 
against security (for employees). The result was a balanced trade-
off with concessions. This happened within a local context where 
the threat of relocation concurred to restrain the union capability 
to act autonomously at the level of local bargaining and oppose 
the headquarters’ decisions. The outcome for the workers is 
temporary short-term security. This is reflected in the domestically 
negotiated and implemented arrangements. In Germany, with 
80% union density, works councils accepted overtime, a 10% 
wage reduction, short-time working schemes, and agency work, 
in return for investment and employment guarantees. Similarly, 
in Belgium (also 80% union density) and in Italy (88% union 
density), the unions negotiated working time reductions (1-2 
days), job rotation and temporary lay-offs, to increase flexibility 
while retaining job security. Finally, in the UK (70% union 
density) working time reduction (from a 39- to a 35-hour working 
week) and working time accounts were used, together with a 
10% pay cut and the use of temporary employment measures 
and voluntary redundancies, in order to save jobs. 
Manu2: “Unbalanced trade-offs to the detriment 
of workers”
Manu2 is a multinational operating within a standardised product 
market and expanding through horizontal integration in a highly 
competitive market. The company uses a just-in-time production 
system, compelling it to operate in geographical proximity to the 
customer. The immediacy between the supplier and the customer 
results in strong flexibility pressures on employees because 
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of employers”
The horizontal integration, high product specialisation and 
entry barriers entail job guarantees independently of whether 
flexibility is reduced or increased in the firm. In terms of 
subsidiary autonomy this implies a relatively high union 
capacity to influence local negotiation. The outcome is an 
unbalanced trade-off to the detriment of employers because 
employees achieve gains in security independently of what 
management demands in terms of flexibility. Two European 
agreements in 2009-2010 facilitated such an outcome. They 
were aimed at using employee retention mechanisms, such as 
requalification and inter-plant mobility in case of restructuring. 
These agreements served as resources for unions to renegotiate 
security solutions with management and compensate for an 
otherwise hostile structural context. For instance, in June 2012, 
the Belgian subsidiary went through a heavy restructuring 
process because of a reduction in orders linked to the economic 
crisis. The headquarters threatened the local unions with 
30% collective redundancy. The union response was to refuse 
concessions. This was possible because they were able to use 
the EFA to retain employees by extending its effect at the plant 
level, thereby avoiding concessions. Likewise, on the basis 
of a 30% local union density, the Italian unions resisted the 
headquarters’ demand to increase the use of project-work and 
agency workers. Strengthened by the content of the EFA and 
backed up by the discretion it enjoyed at the local level, the 
Italian union arranged an ad hoc company-level agreement 
on the use of an overtime bonus to avoid further increases in 
collectively agreed flexibility. Similarly, in Britain – with 30% 
union density – local unions negotiated new terms and working 
conditions for the skilled agency workers. In Germany, finally, 
the works council rejected management’s request to pay for 
surplus hours in the workforce’s working-time accounts, as this 
would have amounted to an increase in working hours (paid 
overtime). 
Unions’ strategy and the role of EFAs 
Comparison between Manu1 and Manu2 shows that even 
the most powerful local unions are likely to succumb to the 
flexibilisation pressures of a multinational that can easily use 
benchmarking to threaten the unions with a move to a different 
location if its demands are not met. Thus, the resources unions 
can mobilise in isolation, within each domestic context, are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for responding to the 
challenges of transnational corporations. When confronted 
with hostile company environments, as the Manu1 and Manu2 
cases show, in the best of situations unions often respond to 
the management’s threat of downsizing by locally conceding 
flexibility in return for medium-short term security. Conversely, 
in Manu3 and in Manu4 even the relatively weakest local union 
was able to negotiate on workforce retention measures even 
in a situation of management threat of closure. Moreover, 
the relatively weak unions within a single affiliate were able 
to benefit from the positive gains achieved by the stronger 
unions in local negotiation within the other affiliate belonging 
ETUI Policy Brief European Economic, Employment and Social Policy – N°1/2014 
to the same multinational. Hence, in Manu3 and Manu4 we 
see a higher capacity on the part of the unions to locally shape 
flexibility into sustainable long-term security for the workforce 
than we do in Manu1 and Manu2. 
Co-operation and co-ordination across different unions and 
works councils in Manu3 and Manu4 have contributed to 
generating a process of internal negotiation which influenced 
the configuration of actors and the bargaining with local 
management, particularly on employment security. In Manu3 
and Manu4, trade unions have become negotiating partners 
for agreements at the European level on aspects of security, 
such as training, requalification, career progression and 
competence development for the workforce. These agreements 
became strategic resources for the local unions during times of 
economic difficulty. They strengthened the union capacity to 
make proactive use of the local discretion to convert flexibility 
into long-term security programmes for the employees. Thus, 
the crucial question is not what is “the second best option” for 
unions when hostile environments constrain their capacity to 
guarantee job security (“making concessions”); it is, rather, how 
union and works councils can create around themselves the 
requisite infrastructures for providing support, when needed, in 
the negotiation of long-term security for the employees. 
Findings illustrate that EFAs are the tools that trade unions 
need when confronted with management challenges relating 
to employment insecurity. Negotiation of EFAs is likely in those 
MNCs – as the cases of Manu3 and Manu4 demonstrate – that 
are characterised by relatively well supported structural contexts, 
inclusive of firm- and market-related conditions. These conditions 
open up space for local discretion that would, conversely, be 
difficult to develop in MNCs facing hostile environmental 
situations. However, we see that MNCs operating within hostile 
contexts are, paradoxically, better shaped to offer unions the 
capacity to exert transnational influence. For example, a union 
can better press for cross-country comparisons in precisely those 
MNCs where workers within different affiliates share similar 
working environments because of the standardised nature 
of the product, and where they can identify with a common 
employing organisation (Marginson 1992). As such, the crucial 
aspect here is the willingness of different local unions to bridge 
borders and operate in a spirit of coordination and solidarity. 
However, the question still remains: why should local unions be 
interested in EFAs? As the Manu3 and Manu4 cases remarkably 
illustrate, negotiation of EFAs has the advantage of extending 
the content of the agreement to the different local affiliates 
within an MNC. It means empowering the local unions within 
multinationals to spread the positive gains of local negotiations 
where they have been relatively strong and successful to other 
local subsidiaries where, conversely, the attempt to conduct 
bargaining on employment protection has proved more of 
a struggle. Hence, how trade unions in Europe will be able 
to enhance their influence in negotiations on employment 
protection will depend not only on their national and local 
power but also on the extent to which, for bargaining purposes, 
they develop, within multinationals, their engagement in 
cross-border networking and coordination. In this respect the 
5coordination provided by the ETUFs is crucial in ensuring proper 
communication and framework conditions for the signature of 
EFAs and their success in a medium-to-long term perspective. 
EWCs, as existing infrastructures at the transnational company 
level, can facilitate contacts among employee representatives 
but they cannot substitute for the ample trade union 
infrastructure required for the transnational coordination 
of bargaining and which is a prerequisite, above all, for the 
signature of transnational collective agreements. In this respect, 
the study is aimed at raising awareness amongst local unions of 
the possibility of seeking transnational coordination from the 
ETUFs for the signature of EFAs. 
Conclusion 
Bargaining outcomes over flexibility and security among 
subsidiaries of multinationals can range from unions 
negotiating flexibility in exchange for short-term job security to 
unions participating in the shaping of flexibility to foster long-
term security for workers. These outcomes are framed in the 
context where market and firm-level features play an important 
– albeit not determining – role. The unions’ capacity to bargain 
for employment security, particularly in situations where the 
company is experiencing economic difficulties, depends on 
their local strength. It may be possible to guarantee temporary 
security solutions as the result of unions engaging in concession 
bargaining on flexibility. Although conceding flexibility in 
return for security leads to jobs – which otherwise would be 
at risk – being saved, concessions do not provide sustainable 
employment guarantees. As proved by evidence within hostile 
market and firm-level contexts, where the capacity of local unions 
to engage autonomously in local bargaining may be eroded by 
contingencies related to the environment, unions may find it 
useful to make use of cross-border networking to negotiate on 
training, career progression and competence development as a 
way of shaping flexibility into socially sustainable security. EFAs 
can be used for this purpose. This involvement allows workers in 
different subsidiaries to benefit from the positive gains achieved 
by other subsidiaries.
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